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This paper studies information transmission in large economies and sheds
light on how information may get incorporated into a fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium price function. To do so, we use an approach based
on the core. We concentrate on the core based on endogenous information
transmission. We shall call such a core the core with respect to (w.r.t.) equi-
librium blocking, in that each blocking move is identiﬁed with an equilibrium
of a communication mechanism used by coalitions. This was the unifying ap-
proach proposed in Serrano and Vohra (2007), and we pursue it further here.
Indeed, as shown in that paper, this general notion of core encompasses other
notions previously proposed in the literature: if coalitions are restricted to
use deterministic mechanisms that involve only one coalition, it boils down
to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2005); if they can use random mech-
anisms that are subjected to a measurability restriction explained below, the
approach yields Myerson’s (2007) virtual utility core; and if such restrictions
in random mechanisms are removed, one obtains the randomized mediated
core of Serrano and Vohra (2007).1
The core convergence theorem is an important cornerstone of the relation-
ship between the predictions of game theory in large economies and compet-
itive equilibrium allocations. Many results have followed the seminal works
of Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Aumann (1964); see Anderson (2008) for a
recent survey. This paper focuses on interim economies with hidden types,
a leading class of problems within asymmetric information (in it, each agent
has private information that is not public knowledge). As already stated, we
shall concentrate on a core concept that models the information transmission
that goes on within each coalition endogenously. We shall present an array
of negative and positive results for the main replica processes proposed in
earlier literature (independent, ex-post and signal-based), leading to a fairly
comprehensive picture of the problem at the interim stage.
1The literature has been asking the question of which is the “right” notion of asym-
metric information core for some time. In this respect, we think that understanding our
results as “this core converges” and “that core does not converge” is not the best reading
of our contribution. As already stated, several core concepts in the literature are all illus-
trations of the same core, one in which the tools of mechanism design are used to set up
each blocking move as a Bayesian equilibrium of a communication mechanism among the
participants. Also, to avoid the long name of the concept, we shall shorten it: for example,
instead of saying “core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of deterministic mechanisms,” we shall
say from now on “core of deterministic mechanisms,” and so on.
1The core convergence question in the ex-ante stage (i.e., that in which
no agent has received any private information) has also been studied. For
this stage, if no restrictions are imposed on the set of allocations, the ques-
tion is simply a reformulation of the standard problem in an Arrow-Debreu
economy framework. Indeed, the most interesting cases happen when either
measurability or incentive compatibility restrictions are imposed.2
There are also results obtained for the ex-post stage (i.e., that in which
all private information has been made common knowledge).3 The results in
the current paper will connect with some of these, due to the information
transmission embodied in the interim core we study, which, if one allows
unrestricted communication blocking mechanisms, places it closer to an ex-
post solution concept.
For the interim stage, our concern here, we shall consider independent
replicas, ex-post replicas and signal-based replicas. Independent replicas were
introduced in Gul and Postlewaite (1992) and also studied in Forges, Heifetz
and Minelli (2001). Independent replicas also replicate the states of the
world, and in them, each agent’s preferences depend only on the information
pertinent to his replica. Thus, agents’ information is relevant to a negligible
set of agents in large economies. Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001) studies
ex-post replicas, i.e., replicas in which the set of states of the world is not
replicated with the economy. This implies that, already in the second replica,
the economy is one of non-exclusive information in the sense of Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986) and incentive constraints become redundant. The
signal-based replicas of McLean and Postlewaite (2005) lie somewhere in
between: the set of underlying unobservable states is not replicated, and
agents receive signals that, if pooled, come close to identifying the true state,
although this never happens. The unobservable state is a common value in
agents’ preferences, while types –signals– are purely informational, aﬀecting
2Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (2001) study the convergence of the ex-ante incentive
compatible core using the independent replication process. McLean and Postlewaite (2005)
establish a positive convergence result for the ex-ante incentive compatible core in a signal-
based replication process. The reader is referred to Allen and Yannelis (2001) and Forges,
Minelli and Vohra (2002) for general surveys of the area.
3See, for example, Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2000a), who work with atomless
economies, assuming the number of states is ﬁnite. Although we shall argue that in ex-
post replicas the continuum case is covered, it is not clear to us how to extend our other
replicas analysis to atomless economies: the state space would also become “atomless,”
and then, it would be diﬃcult to deﬁne the join information of a coalition, for example,
hindering the use of the arguments in that paper.
2only probability assessments. Agents in the three replica processes become
informationally small in diﬀerent ways and it is important to understand the
diﬀerent properties of information ﬂows in each case.
Our starting point is to consider economies in which the state is not
veriﬁable ex-post, and thus, incentive constraints become important. For
these economies, one can use the tools of mechanism design to propose a
core notion in which communication within coalitions is endogenous; this
notion of “core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking” takes center stage in our study
and we describe it in the sequel. However, importantly, we shall also study
how our main results extend to economies without incentive constraints.4
We shall assume that agents in our economies have quasilinear prefer-
ences. For this class, diﬀerent core existence results have been provided (see
Dutta and Vohra (2005), Myerson (2007)). It is important to stress that non-
emptiness is in general hard to achieve for the interim core once incentive
constraints are in place, as pointed out by Vohra (1999) and Forges, Mertens
and Vohra (2002). Aside non-emptiness, some of our proofs also rely on the
quasilinearity assumption (especially the generalized version of the ﬁrst wel-
fare theorem, i.e., the inclusion of equilibrium in the core). Myerson (2007)
notes that, even in quasilinear settings, random blockings make a diﬀerence
to the deﬁnition of the core in the presence of asymmetric information (un-
like what is known for complete information games). The current work shows
that, even in quasilinear economies, depending on the replica process and on
how much information transmission one allows in random blocking plans,
the answer that one obtains to the core convergence question is also very
diﬀerent.
If blocking communication mechanisms are deterministic and use only
one coalition, our core yields the credible core. The credible core, proposed
in Dutta and Vohra (2005), is the set of incentive compatible allocations
immune to credible objections. A coalition has a credible objection if it can
identify an informational event such that the types of agents involved in the
event are the only ones that prefer the alternative proposed to the status
quo, given that the other types behave as prescribed in the objection. This
4A word about the proof method followed here is called for. The core we employ relies
heavily on the machinery of mechanism design and the revelation principle. Thus, incentive
constraints are at the center of the analysis. These cause problems to non-emptiness of
the core. We are careful in our proofs to construct arguments that rely on information
transmission, with independence of whether or not it incorporates incentive constraints.
The scope of our conclusions is enhanced as a result.
3self-selection ensures that a type wishes to participate in the objection if and
only if it is consistent with the objection’s event. Therefore, the information
transmitted in the objection via the event is “credible” in that the types
that are not part of it have no incentive to join the objection; hence the
name of the concept. But there is no good reason to restrict attention to
such communication mechanisms, the main point being that blocking is to
be understood as an equilibrium phenomenon from which information trans-
mission is derived endogenously. For instance, if a certain class of measurable
random communication mechanisms is permitted, our core yields the concept
proposed in Myerson (2007). Based on the virtual utility construct, Myer-
son (2007) proposes a core notion that imposes the credibility requirements
over random coalition formation and random allocations for each coalition.
Serrano and Vohra (2007), which sets up the Dutta-Vohra and Myerson ob-
jections as communication mechanisms played by the agents in each coalition
and derives their objections’ inequalities from the equilibria of such commu-
nication games, also relax the measurability restriction used in Myerson’s
mechanisms. Indeed, the use of unrestricted random blockings is one diﬀer-
ence between Myerson’s (2007) concept and that arrived at in Serrano and
Vohra (2007), which had not been previously emphasized, and such a diﬀer-
ence plays an important role in some of our results. The issue concerns the
possibility of information transmission within a random blocking plan across
the diﬀerent coalitions that comprise it. Correspondingly, we shall talk about
the core of an increasingly large class of communication mechanisms: deter-
ministic mechanisms (the credible core of Dutta-Vohra), measurable random
mechanisms (the virtual utility core of Myerson), and unrestricted random
mechanisms (the randomized mediated core of Serrano-Vohra). Details will
be provided in Section 2.
Our results show both negative and positive convergence conclusions,
and both are important in the understanding of information ﬂows in large
economies. First, in independent replicas, we shall propose a simple robust
example to demonstrate that the core of measurable random mechanisms
–and thus, of deterministic mechanisms a fortiori– does not shrink to any
price equilibrium notion. However, if information transmission is allowed
to ﬂow within the coalitions that participate in a given random blocking
plan, the strictly incentive compatible allocations in the core of unrestricted
mechanisms converge to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian
allocations. We remark again that incentive constraints are not of the essence.
In ex-post replicas, Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001) have exhibited a
4robust failure of the core convergence theorem for cores in which there is
only exogenous information transmission. Essentially, for cores that use a
limited amount of exogenously speciﬁed information transmission (e.g., the
coarse core of Wilson (1978)), the core is “too large” and does not shrink
down to the set of price allocations; and the core that exogenously allows
any kind of communication (Wilson’s ﬁne core) is often “too small,” even
empty, still when price allocations can be supported. In contrast, we shall
show that the core of deterministic mechanisms converges to the set of ex-
post Walrasian allocations (recall that in these replicas incentive constraints
can be dropped in the second replica). Thus, in this case, there is no need to
resort to random communication mechanisms to obtain a full revelation of
information result; modelling communication as an equilibrium phenomenon
within a coalition suﬃces.
In signal-based replicas, we show a probabilistic convergence result for
the core of unrestricted mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, for large enough replicas
the probability of a speciﬁc informational event is arbitrarily close to 1. The
informational event in question consists of those signal proﬁles for which at
any core allocation the ex-post utility of almost all agents is arbitrarily close
to that obtained at an ex-post Walrasian allocation in some state. For these
replicas, we do not know the answer to the convergence question for the core
of restricted mechanisms (deterministic, for instance).
Regarding the quasilinearity assumption, we note that our core shrinking
argument in independent and ex-post replicas does not rely on it. That
is, even without it, one can show that if such a replica of an allocation is
in the core in all replicas, it will have the ex-post Walrasian property. In
contrast, the probabilistic core shrinking in signal-based replicas does rely
on quasilinearity. And more importantly, what deﬁnitely fails in the absence
of quasilinearity is the other part of the argument, that is, the inclusion of
equilibrium in the core, since insurance opportunities exist that render the
equilibrium allocation interim ineﬃcient (Laﬀont (1985)).
To conclude with the introduction, our ﬁndings shed light on the rather
more mysterious information transmission that goes on within a price func-
tion in a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (Radner (1979),
Allen (1981)). Indeed, such an equilibrium yields ex-post Walrasian alloca-
tions. Our convergence result for the core suggests that the full revelation
of information that accompanies the price function is a consequence of the
communication mechanisms –unrestricted random blocking plans– used by
coalitions in large economies: an allocation without the market equilibrium
5property does not survive these blocking moves, after such communication
devices are employed. That is, a Bayesian equilibrium blocking of some
such communication mechanism, in which information is credibly transmit-
ted, knocks that allocation out of the core. The allocations that remain in
the core of every replica are therefore immune to any conceivable credible
communication, and those happen to be the ex-post Walrasian allocations.
On the other hand, the core does not shrink enough if either information
transmission is prevented to circulate across diﬀerent coalitions that partici-
pate in a given random blocking plan (e.g., when replicas are independent),
or if it is not an equilibrium phenomenon (e.g., when one works with ex-post
replicas).
By taking an approach based on the core, the current paper reaches con-
clusions about informational ﬂows in large economies that are independent
of the speciﬁc trading procedure. Our ﬁndings therefore complement other
results in the literature, directly grounded on non-cooperative game-theoretic
models, in terms of providing foundations/criticisms of rational expectations
equilibria in studies of speciﬁc procedures. These include Holden and Sub-
rahmanyan (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) in models ´ a la Kyle
(1985); Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1987) and Forges and Minelli (1997)
in market games ´ a la Shapley and Shubik (1977); Milgrom (1981), Pesendor-
fer and Swinkels (1997), Reny and Perry (2006) and Peters and Severinov
(2008) in auctions; and Wolinsky (1990), Blouin and Serrano (2001) and
Gottardi and Serrano (2005) in matching& bargaining and related models.
The latter paper also includes a detailed description of the relevant issues in
these and other papers.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 An Interim Exchange Economy
The basic model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information that
we shall use in this paper can be formulated as follows. Let Ti denote the
(ﬁnite) set of agent i’s types. The interpretation is that ti ∈ Ti denotes
the private information possessed by agent i. With N = {1,...,n} as the
ﬁnite set of agents, let TN =
Q
i∈N Ti denote the set of all information states.





j∈S Tj and T−S =
Q
j/ ∈S Tj. We assume that agents have a common
6prior probability distribution q deﬁned on TN, and that no type is redundant,
i.e., q(ti) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti for all i. At the interim stage, nature chooses
tN ∈ TN, and each agent i knows her type, ti. Hence, conditional probabilities
will be important: for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability of
t−i ∈ T−i, given ti is denoted q(t−i | ti).
We assume that there are |L| = l, a ﬁnite number of commodities, and
that commodity L is a numeraire. The consumption set of agent i is Xi =
Rl−1
+ ×R. Agent i’s utility function in state tN is denoted ui(·,t N):Xi×TN 7→




endowment of agent i of type ti is ωi ∈ Xi (assumed to be independent of
the state – with this assumption, all private information concerns agents’
preferences and beliefs.)
We can now deﬁne an admissible exchange economy as E = h(ui,X i,ω i,
Ti)i∈N,qi.
In our analysis, the contracts will be signed at the interim stage. However,
when a coalition gets together and considers to upset a given allocation, some
information may be transmitted within the members of the coalition. We
shall allow coalitions to use random incentive compatible mechanisms, as we
explain next.
2.2 Allocation Rules as Mechanisms
2.2.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
For coalition S ⊆ N, a feasible deterministic (state contingent) S-allocation,
x : TN 7→ Rls (where s denotes the cardinality of S), consists of a commodity





for all tN ∈ TN, and satisfying that x(tS,t 0
−S)=x(tS,t 00
−S) for all tS ∈ TS
and for all t0
−S,t 00
−S ∈ T−S. (The latter assumption is made to exclude basic
externalities across coalitions, i.e., the set of feasible allocations to a coalition
is independent of the information held by the complement, although this may
aﬀect the utilities of agents in the coalition). We will denote by AS the set of
feasible deterministic state contingent allocations of S. With confusion being
avoided by the context, we shall also use AS to denote the set of feasible






i∈S ωi}. Similarly, deterministic state contingent N-allocations are simply
referred to as deterministic allocations, and the set of such deterministic
allocations is denoted by AN.
7For much of this paper, we shall work in environments in which the in-
formation state will not be veriﬁable, not even at the ex-post stage. Thus,
it becomes necessary to impose the incentive compatibility constraints into
the analysis.
We begin again by considering deterministic allocations. Then, if agent i
of type ti pretends to be of type t0










An allocation x is incentive compatible (IC) if for every i ∈ N, and for every
ti ∈ Ti,




i ∈ Ti \{ ti}. We denote the set of IC allocations by A∗
N.A n
allocation x is strictly IC if all these inequalities are strict.
Information transmission concerns ruling out some states as impossible,
through the identiﬁcation of smaller events. For an event E ⊆ TN and ti ∈ Ti,
let
E−i(ti)={t−i ∈ T−i | (ti,t −i) ∈ E}
and
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | E−i(ti) 6= ∅}.
Consider an allocation rule x ∈A N, agent i of type ti and an event E.








The corresponding interim utility (conditional on E) if type ti pretends
to be of type t0











Given E ⊆ TN,a nS-allocation x ∈A S is IC over E if for every i ∈ S and
for every ti,t 0
i ∈ Ei:




At this point it will be convenient to introduce the notion of a status quo.
By a status quo we refer to an IC, state contingent allocation x ∈A ∗
N with
the interpretation that in every state tN, the outcome is x(tN), unless there
is an agreement to change it. This means, in particular, that if there is an
attempt to change the status quo but the attempt fails, the outcome in state
tN is x(tN), i.e., any discussion about a possible change does not by itself
allow any agent to strategically manipulate the status quo x.
To potentially destabilize a status quo, now we expand coalitional interac-
tions and information transmission to also consider random plans. A random
coalitional plan µ consists of a collection of probability distributions over fea-
sible allocation rules for various coalitions. In particular, µ(S,yS,t N), where
yS ∈A S, denotes the probability with which coalition S ⊆ N is receiving
yS ∈A S when the (reported) state is tN ∈ TN.
We shall say that such a random plan is measurable with respect to coali-
tional information, or simply measurable, if for every S, for every yS and for
every tS, µ(S,yS,(tS,t 0
−S)) = µ(S,yS,(tS,t 00
−S)) for every t0
−S,t 00
−S ∈ T−S.
Otherwise, we shall say that the random plan is non-measurable. Non-
measurabilities in this sense are in principle possible, although we shall al-
ways require that, if P is the union of all coalitions in the support of µ,
µ(S,yS,(tP,t 0
−P)) = µ(S,yS,(tP,t 00
−P)) for all (S,yS) in the support of µ, all
tP ∈ TP and all t0
−P,t 00
−P ∈ T−P. The idea is to think of the random plan
as a mediated communication mechanism used by the members of the coali-
tion; thus, information can potentially ﬂow in any possible way within the
mechanism, but only information available to someone that participates in
the random plan.
Note that, if µ(S,yS,t N) > 0 implies µ(S,zS,t N) = 0 for all zS 6= yS,w e
would associate with each coalition S one deterministic allocation yS ∈A S.
Also, if µ(S0,·,·) = 0 for every S0 6= S, the plan relies only on a single coali-
tion. But in general a random plan may include random allocations within
each coalition, as well as random coalition formation. The plan speciﬁes for





yS µ(S,yS,t N) ≤ 1.
For type ti of agent i, the interim utility of such a random plan µ, com-
pleted with the implementation of the status quo x as needed when the



















If everyone else is truthful and type ti pretends to be type t0
i, his interim





























Note how the type misreport aﬀects the implementation probabilities µ(·)
of each coalitional allocation, and therefore also νi(·) of the status quo. In
addition, it garbles the outcomes in each yS, but not those in x. In the next
subsection, we shall go over this, which is related to the timing of events in
the blocking plan versus the status quo; see also Myerson (2007) and Serrano
and Vohra (2007).
A random plan µ is IC if for every i ∈ N and for every ti,t 0
i in the support
of µ:
Ui([µ/x] | ti) ≥ Ui([µ/x],t
0
i | ti).
2.3 Core w.r.t. Equilibrium Blocking
The crux of this paper is the endogenous information transmission that goes
on within a coalition of asymetrically informed agents (unlike, say, the con-
cepts of coarse and ﬁne core in Wilson’s (1978) seminal work). To study such
endogenous information transmission, the concepts presented so far can be
used to deﬁne appropriate versions of the core. It is important to remark
that, when coupled with an IC allocation x ∈A ∗
N, interpreted as the status
quo, a random plan trying to upset it may allow for the status quo to prevail
with some positive probability. That is, since a random plan µ against the
5More precisely, if a random plan µ includes random allocations within each coalition,
then µ might have uncountable support, and hence, the interim utility should be deﬁned
incorporating this. For simplicity, we assume that µ allows only countable support. None
of our arguments rely on this assumption.
10presence of status quo x allows for each tN ∈ TN,0≤ µ(S,yS,t N) ≤ 1 for




yS µ(S,yS,t N) ≤ 1, one must
assign the rest of probability ν(tN) to the implementation of the status quo.6
We next deﬁne a random plan as a communication mechanism. Following
Myerson (2007) and Serrano and Vohra (2007), the discussions of a blocking
plan against a status quo in a context of incomplete information take place
after the truthful reports for the status quo have occurred, but before the
implementation of such a status quo. Therefore, one can specify the following
timing of actions within the blocking plan µ against an IC x:
• Stage 0: types are reported to sustain x as an IC allocation. These
type reports t0
N will be used every time the status quo needs to be
implemented, and their reports are made with independence of any
potential blocking plan.7 This stage is therefore not part of the random
plan as a communication mechanism.
• Stage 1: this and the next stages describe the timing of actions within
the blocking plan µ itself. Types are reported again after players have
been informed about µ. Each player is privately informed about the
instances in which µ calls him to act. The type reports of this stage
are used only if and when the blocking plan is implemented.
• Stage 2: players are invited to participate in the blocking plan, i.e.,
phone calls are made by the blocking mediator, taking into account the
probabilities µ(S,yS,t N), which use already the types reported within
µ. Note in particular how a non-measurable plan is perfectly possible,
allowing information transmission from coalition to coalition within µ.
On the other hand, the plan must be measurable with respect to the
information of the union of coalitions within µ.
• Stage 3: each agent in the support of µ is asked to either accept or
reject the blocking plan, and he does so in private communications
with the blocking mediator. An allocation proposed to coalition S is
6When the appropriate payoﬀ inequalities are imposed versus a given status quo, one
describes a “blocking plan” used in the deﬁnition and characterization of the inner core;
see Myerson (1991), Qin (1993) and de Clippel and Minelli (2005).
7If this is not the case and there is complete forward-looking behavior, i.e., agents
envisioning each possible blocking plan before they report their types to sustain the status
quo, one would probably arrive at a concept far aﬁeld from the core.
11implemented if and only if every agent in S accepts the random plan;
otherwise, the status quo x(t0
N) is implemented.
Two observations are in order that justify this communication mecha-
nism, in terms of how it would work under complete information. First, in a
complete information economy, the arrangements behind the status quo and
those behind a blocking move are kept “separate,” in the sense that agents
believe that if the blocking move fails, they can get back to the status quo,
which is still available as it was before the blocking conversations began.
This justiﬁes the use of the reports t0
N every time the blocking plan is not
approved. Second, a player, being informed only of the probabilities µ(·)o f
coalitions that include him, assigns the rest of probability to the status quo
prevaling. Again, under complete information, if a player is not called to
participate in a blocking move, he believes the status quo will happen (even
though it may not be even feasible, once the blocking plan succeeds).
The approach just described is quite general. As explained in Serrano
and Vohra (2007), one could conceivably consider arbitrary communication
mechanisms, but there is a version of the revelation principle at work. Any
equilibrium of such general communication mechanism can be made outcome
equivalent to a Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism just described, in
which types are reported truthfully.
We shall say that there is an equilibrium rejection of x if there exists a
Bayesian equilibrium of the above communication mechanism in which the
plan µ is accepted with positive probability.8 Without loss of generality, an
equilibrium rejection of x will be termed a random blocking plan against x.
Given an IC allocation x ∈A ∗
N, a random plan µ is a random blocking
plan against x whenever for every type ti ∈ Ti:
Ui([µ/x] | ti) ≥ Ui(x | ti)
with at least one strict inequality, and





8We shall think of such an equilibrium to be in pure strategies. A mixed equilib-
rium adds another layer of randomization (on top of the uncertainty about the states,
the random coalition formation and the random allocations of physical goods). Mixed
equilibria can be handled in the approach, but then the expressions written below need
an adjustment in the probabilities.
12Equivalently, one can normalize probabilities and simplify these inequal-











i (tN),t N) − ui(xi(tN),t N)] ≥ 0( ∗)



























i),t N) − ui(xi(tN),t N)]
for all i ∈ N and ti,t 0
i ∈ Ti.( ∗∗)
Thus, information transmission is endogenous in a random blocking plan.
The equilibrium rejection of x implies that those types that are part of the
objection best-respond to the others by accepting it, whereas those types that
are not do not have an incentive to turn their zero probability of participation
into a positive one by pretending to be one of the invited types. This is the
content of equations (*) and (**), which respectively express the equilibrium
acceptance condition and the IC constraints over the event described by the
equilibrium probabilities.
An IC allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of some
class of random communication mechanisms whenever there does not exist
an equilibrium rejection of x, i.e., a random blocking plan against x, for a
communication mechanism in that class.
Particular cases of this deﬁnition are the following. We shall progressively
enlarge the class of blocking communication mechanisms considered:
An IC allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the credible core (Dutta and Vohra (2005))
if and only if it is in the core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms.
That is, whenever there does not exist a random blocking plan µ against x
such that µ(S,yS,t N) > 0 only for one coalition S and one deterministic rule
yS ∈A S, and for tN ∈
Q
i∈S Ei × T−S, where Ei is the set of types of agent
i in the support of µ. Note how, in particular, the deﬁnition of IC over an
event E for an S-allocation for a ﬁxed coalition S, as deﬁned above, applies
to these blocking plans.
Thus, in a credible objection to an allocation, a ﬁxed coalition S identiﬁes
an information event over which the objection takes place. All the types
consistent with that event prefer the objection to the status quo allocation
13after Bayesian updating of their beliefs given the event. Furthermore, no type
within the relevant event wants to misrepresent its information. Finally, the
types not consistent with the event do not wish to participate in the objection
by pretending they are one of the types in it: to see this, in the second
condition of a random blocking plan, suppose ti is one of these excluded
types and t0
i one of the types in the support of µ. The latter is what is
called the credibility restriction in this objection. Hence the name credible
objection. As can be easily seen, all these conditions are particular cases of
equations (*) and (**) above.
An IC allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the virtual utility core (Myerson (2007))
if and only if it is in the core of measurable random mechanisms. That is,
whenever there does not exist a random blocking plan µ against x that is
measurable.
Thus, in these objections, an agent is invited to the blocking plan, but
there is a process of random coalition formation. Each agent in the support of
µ gets a phone call inviting him to participate in the blocking plan, and those
“phone calls” are made according to µ. On the basis of µ, contingent on the
“phone call,” each agent updates his interim beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Again,
given this, each type is part of the equilibrium rejection of x if and only if
he wishes to go along with it instead of remaining at the status quo, and
the appropriate IC constraints are also imposed given µ – equations (*) and
(**). The measurability of the plan implies that a given coalition S cannot be
called with diﬀerent probabilities in two states (tS,t 0
−S) and (tS,t 00
−S) that the
coalition cannot discern (observe in particular that the Dutta-Vohra credible
objections are measurable).
An IC allocation x ∈A ∗
N is in the randomized mediated core (Serrano
and Vohra (2007)) if and only if it is in the core of unrestricted random
mechanisms. That is, whenever there does not exist a random blocking plan
µ against x.
For these objections, the same story applies, except that the non-measurability
of µ allows for information transmission across coalitions within the blocking
plan.
Under the assumptions made so far, and if one allows average feasibility
in the numeraire (while exact feasibility is required for the other commodi-
ties), Myerson (2007) establishes the non-emptiness of the virtual utility core.
Furthermore, his existence argument does not use at all the measurability of
blocking plans. Therefore, it follows that, under exactly the same assump-
tions, the core of unrestricted mechanisms is also non-empty. An alternative
14approach to non-emptiness is provided in Dutta and Vohra (2005). In qua-
silinear economies, assuming that there exists an IC ex-post core allocation,
they show that the credible core is non-empty. It is easy to complete their
argument to show that the core of unrestricted mechanisms is also non-empty
(see the proof of our Proposition 1). That is, adding randomness to blocking
plans does not jeopardize the non-emptiness of the core in this case.
The following is an obvious, but useful observation:
Observation 1: The core of unrestricted mechanisms is a subset of the same
concept based on measurable mechanisms, itself a subset of the concept if
one only uses single-coalition deterministic mechanisms. 9
When incentive constraints can be dropped, one can still deﬁne the corre-
sponding core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking. Then, a core allocation x ∈A N,
and the equilibrium rejection of x amounts only to condition (*). As above,
as a function of the class of communication mechanisms considered, one can
create similar nested sets of allocations. 10 In this case, it can be shown
(Dutta and Vohra (2005), Serrano and Vohra (2007)) that all ﬁne objections
can be made credible, and hence, the core of single-coalition deterministic
mechanisms coincides with the ﬁne core. Without incentive constraints, non-
emptiness results are easier to obtain: in particular, it follows from Dutta
and Vohra (2005) that in quasilinear economies this core is non-empty.
We shall use in some of our proofs the following additional observation:
Observation 2: An IC allocation that is in the ﬁne core (which is in the IC
ﬁne core) is in the core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms.
2.4 Market Equilibrium
The competitive market equilibrium concept that we shall employ in this
paper is the ex-post Walrasian equilibrium: an allocation rule x is an ex-
9It is easy to relate these notions to Wilson’s (see Dutta and Vohra (2005)). If in
a credible objection one drops the credibility restriction (the self-selection of types into
the objection), one constructs an (IC) ﬁne objection. The IC ﬁne core is the set of IC
allocations x ∈A ∗
N immune to IC ﬁne objections. On the other hand, an IC objection
based on a common knowledge event for a coalition is an IC coarse objection, which is
always credible. The IC coarse core is the set of incentive compatible x ∈A ∗
N against
which there is no IC coarse objection. It follows that the IC ﬁne core is a subset of the
credible core, itself a subset of the IC coarse core.
10If one drops the IC constraints from both the status quo allocations and the objections
in the IC coarse core and IC ﬁne core, one arrives at the coarse and ﬁne core deﬁnitions
(Wilson (1978)).
15post Walrasian equilibrium allocation rule if x(tN) constitutes a Walrasian
equilibrium allocation in each tN ∈ TN. We shall assume that there exists
an ex-post Walrasian equilibrium allocation rule that is IC. Under this as-
sumption, our negative convergence result extends also to any price-taking
equilibrium concept that satisﬁes Property P, as ﬁrst suggested in Serrano,
Vohra and Volij (2001):
A price-taking equilibrium concept is said to obey Property P if, whenever
it is non-empty, in an economy that includes some fully informed agents, each
of them receives in equilibrium a bundle that maximizes his ex-post utility
over his ex-post budget constraint.
3 Equilibrium Inclusion in the Core
In this section we begin by showing that, in our domain of quasilinear
economies, the set of ex-post Walrasian allocation rules that satisfy IC is
in the core of unrestricted mechanisms. The section ends by extending the
result when incentive constraints are dropped.
Proposition 1 Consider a quasilinear exchange economy E in our admissi-
ble class. Let x∗ ∈A ∗
N be an ex-post Walrasian equilibrium allocation rule
satisfying IC. Then, x∗ is in the core of unrestricted mechanisms.
Proof: By hypothesis, x∗ is IC. So we need to show that there does not exist
any random blocking plan that improves upon x∗.
Since an ex-post Walrasian allocation is an element of the ex-post core,











This corresponds to an ex-post objection. Now, consider a random plan µ
(without measurability). This inequality implies that for all S ⊆ N, all










































































which contradicts the inequality in the previous paragraph.
Thus, in quasilinear economies, ex-post Walrasian allocation rules that
satisfy IC are elements of the smallest core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking. It
is immediate to drop the incentive constraints from this result, and with the
same proof (note it does not rely on the IC condition (**)), demonstrate the
following:
Proposition 2 Consider a quasilinear exchange economy E in our admis-
sible class, but where incentive constraints are dropped. Let x∗ ∈A N be
an ex-post Walrasian equilibrium allocation rule. Then, x∗ is in the core of
unrestricted mechanisms.
Remark: Ignoring incentive constraints, Dutta and Vohra (2005) show that
in quasilinear economies the ex-post core is included in the ﬁne core, which
is therefore non-empty. The proof of Proposition 2 strengthens this result, as
without incentive constraints, the ﬁne core coincides with the core of single-
coalition deterministic mechanisms.
Remark: Propositions 1 and 2 apply to all quasilinear economies, including
their diﬀerent kinds of replicas, as we are about to deﬁne in the next sections.
Remark: The conclusions of Propositions 1 and 2 do not extend to non-
quasilinear economies. In fact, ex-post Walrasian rules may be even interim
ineﬃcient.
174 Independent Replica Economies
We turn to deﬁne the replicas of the basic economies and allocations. We
shall ﬁrst use the independent replicas introduced in Gul and Postlewaite
(1992), also used in Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (2001). Each agent’s utility
depends only on the information contained in his replica. Because replicas
are independent, the set of states in the replicated economy is the product
of the sets of states for each replica.
Formally, given an economy E = h(ui,X i,ω i,T i)i∈N,qi, and an allocation
x ∈A N, independent replicas of E and x are deﬁned as follows. For every
positive integer m, let Im = {1,2,...,m}. The m-th replica of E is the
economy Em = h(u(i,j),X (i,j),ω (i,j),T (i,j))(i,j)∈N×Im,q mi, where for all (i,j) ∈
N × Im, X(i,j) = Xi, T(i,j) = Ti over
Q
k6=i T(k,j), ω(i,j) = ωi, u(i,j) = ui :
Xi ×
Q
i∈N T(i,j) 7→ R, and




The m-th replica of x is denoted xm where xm
(i,j) = xi for all (i,j) ∈ N × Im.
We shall say that a set of allocation rules satisﬁes the equal treatment
property if, in any replicated economy, it contains only replicas of allocations
x of the basic economy.
Note that the set of information states changes with replication. Since
types are independent, each agent potentially retains a piece of private infor-
mation even after replication, and incentive constraints do not disappear. On
the other hand, since preferences depend only on information held by agents
in the same copy of the economy, an agent’s private information aﬀects a
vanishingly small fraction of agents if one replicates the economy suﬃciently
many times.
4.1 Non-Convergence Results
In the current subsection we show that, even if one restricts attention to equal
treatment allocations, the core of measurable mechanisms does not converge
to any price-taking equilibrium allocations satisfying Property P, no matter
how many times the economy is replicated. Later in this subsection we shall
argue that this core, in any replicated economy, may in addition contain
allocations that violate equal treatment. Thus, if the communication mech-
18anisms used by coalitions are restricted to be measurable random blocking
plans, the core remains “too large.”
4.1.1 Equal Treatment Allocations
Our ﬁrst non-convergence result follows:
Proposition 3 Consider independent replicas. There exists an allocation
˜ x ∈A ∗
N in an admissible economy E satisfying that for every m, ˜ xm is in the
core of measurable mechanisms in the replicated economy Em and that cannot
be supported by any price-taking equilibrium notion that obeys Property P.
Proof: Consider the following economy E. There are two consumers and two
commodities. Suppose T1 = {s,t} while agent 2 is uninformed (and therefore
has only one type). The information state can then be described by s or t.
Suppose s and t are equally probable. Let ω1 = ω2 =( 1 .5,1). The utility
functions are as follows:
u1(x1,x 2,s)=l nx1 + x2,u 2(x1,x 2,s)=2l nx1 + x2,
u1(x1,x 2,t)=2l nx1 + x2,u 2(x1,x 2,t)=l nx1 + x2.
(Recall that throughout we use superscripts to index commodities and sub-
scripts to index consumers.) Thus, the two individuals are ex-ante identical,
but the realized type of individual 1 determines ex-post which of the two has
a higher utility from consumption of the ﬁrst good.11
We consider ﬁrst the allocation ˆ x deﬁned by:
ˆ x1(s)=( 1 ,1.5), ˆ x2(s)=( 2 ,0.5);
ˆ x1(t)=( 2 ,0.5), ˆ x2(t)=( 1 ,1.5).
Then each agent’s ex-post utility is:
u1(ˆ x1(s),s)=1 .5,u 2(ˆ x2(s),s)=2l n2+0 .5,
u1(ˆ x1(t),t)=2l n2+0 .5,u 2(ˆ x2(t),t)=1 .5.
11This example was ﬁrst proposed in Kreps (1977) to illustrate how the set of rational
expectations equilibria might be empty. It was also used in Forges, Heifetz and Minelli
(2001) to show that the equal treatment property does not hold for the ex-ante incentive
compatible core in the two-fold replicated economy.
19Note how ˆ x must be the only allocation prescribed by an equilibrium con-
cept that obeys Property P in this economy. Note also how many equilibrium
concepts will obey this property here, including the ex-post Walrasian equi-
librium, the constrained market equilibrium found in Wilson (1978), or the
rational expectations equilibrium (which here yields the empty set). Finally,
observe that ˆ x is IC.
To construct the allocation we are interested in, we modify ˆ x by requiring
an additional transfer of 0.05 units of good 2 from individual 2 to individual
1 in each state. We denote the resulting allocation as ˜ x:
˜ x1(s)=( 1 ,1.55), ˜ x2(s)=( 2 ,0.45);
˜ x1(t)=( 2 ,0.55), ˜ x2(t)=( 1 ,1.45).
This allocation yields utility levels
u1(˜ x1(s),s)=1 .55,u 2(˜ x2(s),s)=2l n2+0 .45,
u1(˜ x1(t),t)=2l n2+0 .55,u 2(˜ x2(t),t)=1 .45.
We consider now the independent replication process described above.
Recall that we denote individual i in the j-th replica as (i,j). We present
our argument in two claims.
Claim 3.1: For all m, both the m-th replicated allocations ˆ xm and ˜ xm are in
the core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms in Em.
Proof of Claim 3.1: We will show that the m-th replication of ˜ x is in the
core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms in the replicated economy
Em. (The argument for ˆ xm is similar and we omit it.)
Since we can check that ˜ xm is IC (each informed agent in each replica
does not wish to pretend that he is of the other informed type), it suﬃces to
show that ˜ xm is in the ﬁne core of Em; see Observation 2 above.
It is easy to show that ˜ x is maximizing the sum of ex-post utilities for each
state and it is ex-post individually rational. Hence, ˜ x is in the ﬁne core of
the original economy E. Thus, for j =1 ,2,...,m, if the allocation is blocked
by a coalition S that includes both (1,j) and (2,j), then the allocation is
also blocked by S \{ (1,j),(2,j)}. This implies that it is suﬃcient to check
whether coalition S = {(1,1),...,(1,k),(2,k+1 ) ,...,(2,m)} blocks the
allocation ˜ xm for each m and k(0 ≤ k ≤ m). For this possible blocking




j=k+1 T(1,j), where r(1,j) = s or t(1 ≤ j ≤ k).
20Without loss of generality, we may assume that
r(1,j) =
(
s (1 ≤ j ≤ j0)
t (j0 +1≤ j ≤ k)
for some j0(0 ≤ j0 ≤ k). Here, j0 =0 ( j0 = k) means that r(1,j) = t(s) for
every (1,j)(1 ≤ j ≤ k), respectively.
Note that any feasible allocation for coalition S has to be constant on E,
i.e., each uninformed agent must receive the same bundle in both relevant
states. It follows from the quasilinearity that the optimal allocation of good






































λ (1 ≤ j ≤ j0)
2λ (j0 +1≤ j ≤ k)
,x
1




j0 +2 ( k − j0)+1 .5(m − k)
=
1.5m
1.5m +0 .5k − j0.
Then the sum of interim utilities is
j
0 · lnλ +( k − j
0) · 2ln(2λ)+( m − k) · 1.5ln(1.5λ)+m. (1)
On the other hand, the sum of interim utilities of the original allocation
˜ xm for the coalition is
1.55j




{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}·(m − k). (2)
Now it suﬃces to show that (2)−(1) is non-negative for all m,k(0 ≤ k ≤
m) and j0(0 ≤ j0 ≤ k). We denote the diﬀerence [(2) − (1)] as g(j0,k,m).
For ﬁxed k and m(0 ≤ k ≤ m), the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
the variable j0 is
ln(1.5m) − ln(1.5m +0 .5k − j
0).
21Thus the function g is minimized at j0 =0 .5k. Then
g(0.5k,k,m)=1 .05k +( l n2+0 .95)(m − k) − 1.5(m − k)ln1.5 − m
= (ln2 − 1.5ln1.5 − 0.05)(m − k)+0 .05k ≥ 0
(since ln2 − 1.5ln1.5 − 0.05 > 0 and m ≥ k ≥ 0). Therefore, g(j0,k,m) ≥ 0
for every j0,kand m(0 ≤ k ≤ m,0 ≤ j0 ≤ k). Thus, the proof of Claim 3.1
is complete.
Claim 3.2: For all m, both the m-th replicated allocations ˆ xm and ˜ xm are in
the core of measurable mechanisms in Em.
Proof of Claim 3.2: We will show that the m-th replication of ˜ x is in
the core of measurable mechanisms in the replicated economy Em. (The
argument for ˆ xm is similar and we omit it.)
In the proof of Claim 3.1, we have argued that the m-th replication of ˜ x
is in the ﬁne core. Therefore, we have shown that for all S ⊆ N × Im, all













(Recall that qm is the probability distribution over the states in the replicated
economy Em). The earlier inequality corresponds to a ﬁne objection in which
all information within the coalition is transmitted to its members. Now,
consider a random plan µ that satisﬁes T S-measurability. This inequality



































































S,t N×Im)ui(˜ xi(tN),t N).































which contradicts the inequality in the previous paragraph.
Claims 3.1 and 3.2 complete the proof of Proposition 3.
Remark: Note the parallel steps followed by the proofs of Claim 3.2 and
of Proposition 1. There is an important diﬀerence, though. While the al-
location ˜ xm of the proof of Claim 3.2 is in the ﬁne core of every replica, if
x∗ is IC ex-post Walrasian, x∗m is in the ex-post core of every replica. This
diﬀerence matters: in the former case, the non-existence of a ﬁne objection
leads, through the use of measurable blocking plans, to the non-existence
of a measurable equilibrium blocking. In the case of the latter, not having
ex-post objections in any state leads, through the use of (measurable or not)
blocking plans, to the non-existence of any kind of equilibrium blocking.
If incentive constraints are not relevant (as in many general equilibrium
analyses, and also in Wilson’s (1978) original paper), one can state a similar
result to Proposition 3, using an identical proof. The observation is simple
enough: the proofs of Claims 3.1 and 3.2 do not rely on IC conditions (recall
Proposition 2 for the inclusion of the ex-post Walrasian allocations in the
core of unrestricted mechanisms):
Proposition 4 Consider independent replicas and suppose incentive con-
straints are dropped. There exists an allocation ˜ x ∈A N in an admissible
23economy E satisfying that for every m, ˜ xm is in the core of measurable mech-
anisms in the replicated economy Em and that cannot be supported by any
price-taking equilibrium notion that obeys Property P.
Proof: Consider the same economy as in the proof of Proposition 3. Clearly,
even if non-IC random blocking plans are possible, no such blocking exists
for ˜ x. Note how the proof of Proposition 3 makes no use of conditions (**).
4.1.2 Non-Equal Treatment Allocations
In this subsection we demonstrate that the core of measurable mechanisms in
replicated economies also contains allocations that violate equal treatment
across replicas, even if the economy is replicated an arbitrary number of
times.
Indeed, in the same economy used in the proof of Proposition 3, consider
the allocation (ˆ x,...,ˆ x, ˜ x). We shall show that this allocation belongs to the
core of measurable mechanisms in the (m+1)-fold replicated economy Em+1
for all m ≥ 1. That is, in the ﬁrst m replicas, the bundles in ˆ x are allocated,
whereas those in ˜ x are assigned in the last replica, thereby violating the equal
treatment property of this core.
We follow analogous steps to those in Claim 3.1, and ﬁrst show that this
allocation is in the core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms in the
(m + 1)-replicated economy. Since we can easily check that the proposed
allocation is IC, it suﬃces to show that it is in the ﬁne core.12
Now we make the following observations:
Observation 3: For each state, both ˆ x and ˜ x are maximizing the sum of
ex-post utilities. Both allocations are in the ﬁne core of the original economy.
Observation 4: For k =1 ,2,...,m,m+ 1, if the allocation is blocked by
a coalition S that includes both (1,k) and (2,k), then the allocation is also
blocked by S \{ (1,k),(2,k)}.
Observation 5: For k =1 ,2,...,m, if the allocation is blocked by a coali-
tion that includes (2,k) but does not include (1,k), then the allocation is
also blocked by the coalition that includes (1,k) but does not include (2,k)
(by symmetry of allocation ˆ x).
12Again, with the same example, we are showing that this core violates equal treatment
in economies in which incentive constraints are dropped.
24¿From these observations, we can say that it is suﬃcient to check whether
coalition S is one of two possibilities: indeed, either S = {(1,1),...,(1,m),
(2,m+1)} or S = {(1,1),...,(1,m),(1,m+1)} block the proposed allocation
for each m.
For the ﬁrst possible blocking coalition, we can conﬁne our attention to
events of the form E =
Q
i∈S{ri}×T−S, where ri = s or t(i ∈ S\{(2,m+1)}).
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
r(1,i) =
(
s (1 ≤ i ≤ j)
t (j +1≤ i ≤ m)
for some j(0 ≤ j ≤ m). Here, j =0 ( j = m) means that the types of all
individuals in S \{ (2,m+1 ) } are s (t), respectively.
Note that any feasible allocation has to be constant on E and utility of
every individual other than (2,m+ 1) is determined on E. It follows from






























(2,m+1) ≤ 1.5(m +1 ) .





λ (1 ≤ i ≤ j)
2λ (j +1≤ i ≤ m)
and x1
(2,m+1) =1 .5λ, where
λ =
1.5(m +1 )
j +2 ( m − j)+1 .5
.
Then the sum of interim utilities is:
j · lnλ +( m − j) · 2ln(2λ)+1 .5ln(1.5λ)+( m +1 ) . (3)
On the other hand, the sum of interim utilities of the original allocation
is:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}. (4)
25Now it suﬃces to show that (4)−(3) is non-negative for all m and j(0 ≤
j ≤ m). We write the diﬀerence:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}
− [j · lnλ +( m − j) · 2ln(2λ)+1 .5ln(1.5λ)+( m + 1)]
Take partial derivative with respect to j:
1 − 2ln2− lnλ + 2ln(2λ) − (2m − j +1 .5)[∂ lnλ/∂j]
=1 + l n λ − (2m − j +1 .5)[∂ lnλ/∂j]
=l n λ =l n [
1.5m +1 .5
2m − j +1 .5
],
which vanishes at j =0 .5m, is negative for j<0.5m and positive thereafter.
Therefore, it suﬃces to check the value of the function at j =0 .5m for a
ﬁxed m:
0.75m +( 2l n2+0 .5)(0.5m)+
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}
−[(0.5m) · 2ln2+1.5ln(1.5 )+( m + 1)]
=l n 2 m +
1
2
{(2ln2 + 0.45) + 1.45}−[(0.5m) · 2ln2+1.5ln(1.5) + 1]
=l n 2 m +l n2+0 .95 − [ln2m +1 .5ln(1.5) + 1]
=l n 2 − 0.05 − [1.5ln(1.5)] = 0.0340... > 0.
Since this value is independent of m, we have shown that for all j satis-
fying that 0 ≤ j ≤ m for all m ≥ 1, the diﬀerence (4)−(3) is positive, which
contradicts that the coalition blocks the original allocation.
If the blocking coalition contains agent (1,m+ 1) instead of (2,m+ 1),
one can have two cases:
First, it is agent (1,m+ 1) in state s. We write the utility diﬀerence,
similar to (4) − (3), for this case:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+1 .55
− [(j +1 )· lnλ +( m − j) · 2ln(2λ)+( m + 1)]
and now λ =( 1 .5m +1 .5)/(2m − j + 1).
26Again, we partially diﬀerentiate the aggregate utility diﬀerence with re-
spect to j:
1 − 2ln2 + lnλ +2l n2− (2m − j + 1)[∂ lnλ/∂j]
=l nλ = ln[
1.5m +1 .5
2m − j +1
],
which vanishes at j =0 .5m − 0.5, is negative if j<0.5m − 0.5 and positive
thereafter.
We thus check the value of the aggregate utility diﬀerence at j =0 .5m−
0.5:
1.5(0.5m − 0.5 )+( 2l n2+0 .5)(0.5m +0 .5) + 1.55
−[(0.5m +0 .5)2ln2 + (m + 1)]
=0 .75m − 0.75 + ln2(m +1 )+0 .25m +0 .25 + 1.55 − [(m + 1)(1 + ln2)]
=0 .05 > 0,
and also independent of m, so we are also done with this case. Finally, we
have case 2: agent (1,m+1) acts in state t. The utility diﬀerence similar to
(2)−(1) is now:
1.5j +( 2l n2+0 .5)(m − j)+2l n2+0 .55
− [j · lnλ +( m +1− j) · 2ln(2λ)+( m + 1)],
where now λ =( 1 .5m +1 .5)/(2m − j + 2).
Diﬀerentiating partially with respect to j, one gets:
1 − 2ln2− [lnλ − 2ln(2λ)+( 2 m − j + 2)(∂ lnλ/∂j)]
= −2ln2− [lnλ − 2ln(2λ)]
=l n λ =l n [
1.5m +1 .5
2m − j +2
],
which vanishes at j =0 .5m+0.5, is negative at j<0.5m+0.5, and positive
thereafter. Therefore, it suﬃces to check the value of the aggregate utility
diﬀerence at j =0 .5m +0 .5:
1.5(0.5m +0 .5) + (2ln2 + 0.5)(0.5m − 0.5)
+2ln2 + 0.55 − [(m + 1)(ln2 + 1)]
=0 .05 > 0,
27also independent of m.
Thus, now the proof is complete. No such blocking coalition exists and
the proposed allocation is in the IC ﬁne core, and hence, also in the core of
single-coalition deterministic mechanisms (Observation 2).
The arguments to show that the allocation is in the core of measurable
mechanisms are similar to the inequalities derived in Claim 3.2, and we there-
fore omit them.
4.2 Convergence of the Core of Unrestricted Mecha-
nisms
In this subsection we show that the allocations of the core of unrestricted
mechanisms converge to the set of ex-post Walrasian allocations as the econ-
omy is replicated enough times. Thus, in a large enough replica, unrestricted
random blocking plans are capable of knocking out any allocation without the
ex-post market equilibrium property. Recall that the inclusion of equilibrium
in this core was shown in Proposition 1.
Speciﬁcally, we begin by showing that the strictly IC allocations in the
core of unrestricted mechanisms satisfy equal treatment, and that they con-
verge, as the economy is replicated enough times, to the set of IC ex-post
Walrasian allocations. As we have been doing in previous ones, incentive
constraints are dropped later in this subsection.
Proposition 5 Consider independent replicas, and suppose that, in every
ex-post state, the core convergence theorem holds.13
• (i) The strictly IC allocations in the core of unrestricted mechanisms
satisfy the equal treatment property.
• (ii) If the economy is suﬃciently replicated, x is a strictly IC allocation
rule in the economy E and its replica xm is in the core of unrestricted
mechanisms in Em for every m, then x must be an ex-post Walrasian
allocation rule.
13Strictly speaking, we cannot use the theorem in Debreu and Scarf (1963): their con-
sumption set is the non-negative orthant of the L-dimensional Euclidean space, while we
allow negative consumption in the numeraire. This diﬀerence does not aﬀect the validity
of the ex-post core convergence result, though.
28Proof: (i) First, we show that for every m ≥ 2, the equal treatment property
holds for the core of unrestricted mechanisms under strict IC. Suppose not.
That is, for some i, some j,j0, and some tN, xm
(i,j)(¯ tm) 6= xm
(i,j0)(¯ tm), where
¯ tm := (tN,t N,...,t N). We shall show that there exists a random blocking
plan that improves upon (xm
(i,j))(i,j)∈N×Im.
By the ex-post equal treatment property, there exists a coalition S ⊂
N × Im and a feasible plan yS, such that ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t N) >u i(xi(¯ tm),t N) for
all i ∈ S. Consider another allocation rule x0 arbitrarily close to x, also
strictly IC, satisfying that xi = x0
i for all i/ ∈ S.
Let us consider the following blocking plan µ for N×Im: µ(S,yS(¯ tm),¯ tm)=
ε>0,µ(N × Im,x 0(¯ tm),¯ tm)=1− ε>0 and µ assigns zero for any other
state.
Since x0 satisﬁes IC, we can see that both conditions (*) and (**) of
Section 2 are satisﬁed for any i/ ∈ S.F o r i ∈ S, conditions (*) are clearly
satisﬁed. For the conditions (**) –IC–, one has two cases:
Case 1: Agent i’s true type is ti and he reports t0
i. Then, the LHS
of (**) is, because of the state probability, approximately proportional to
ε[ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t N) − ui(xm
i (¯ tm),t N)] > 0, while the RHS is 0.
Case 2: Agent i’s true type is t0
i and he reports ti. Let t0 := (t0
i,t N\{i}).
Then, the LHS of (**) is 0, whereas the RHS is proportional to ε[ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t 0)
−ui(xi(t0),t 0)] + (1 − ε)[ui(x0
i(¯ tm),t 0) − ui(xm
i (t0),t 0)].
Since ui(x0
i(¯ tm),t 0) − ui(xm
i (t0),t 0) < 0 by strict IC, by taking ε small
enough, we can obtain that the RHS is negative. Hence the equal treatment
property holds.
(ii) Next we show that if x is a strictly IC allocation rule in the economy
E and its replica xm is in the core of unrestricted mechanisms in Em for every
m, x must be an ex-post Walrasian allocation rule. Suppose not. That is,
let x be a strictly IC allocation rule whose replica is in this core of every
replicated economy, but suppose that x(tN) is not a Walrasian allocation for
some tN.
By the ex-post core convergence theorem, there exists m such that in the
m-th replication of the ex-post economy in tN, there exists a coalition S and a
feasible plan yS ∈A S, S ⊆ N ×Im, such that ui(yS
i (¯ tm),t N) >u i(xi(tN),t N)
for all i ∈ S, where ¯ tm =( tN,t N,...,t N). Consider another allocation rule
x0 arbitrarily close to x, also strictly IC, satisfying that xi = x0
i for all i/ ∈ S.
By considering a mechanism similar to the one used above, we can say, using
the same arguments, that there exists a randomized mediated blocking for
xm.
29Remark: The proof of Proposition 5 does not use the assumption that
the set of IC ex-post Walrasian allocations is non-empty. In its absence, the
proposition implies the non-existence of allocations in the core of unrestricted
mechanisms in suﬃciently large replicas.
To illustrate the shrinking of the core of unrestricted mechanisms, we
shall consider again the economy in the proof of Claim 3.1. Indeed, we show
now that ˜ x, which was shown to be in the core when only measurable block-
ing mechanisms were considered, is blocked by a non-measurable random
blocking plan.
Example 1 Consider the economy in the proof of Proposition 3. First, note
that the second replication of ˜ x is not in the ex-post core. For instance, it
is blocked by coalition S = {(2,1),(1,2),(2,2)} in state (s,s) (this notation
means that for each of the two replicas the type of individual 1 is s). We
denote an ex-post blocking allocation bundle for S as yS(s,s).
For coalition S0 = {(1,1),(2,1)}, we deﬁne an allocation bundle yS0(s,s)
as follows: yS0
(1,1)(s,s)=( 1 ,1.56) and yS0
(2,1)(s,s)=( 2 ,0.44), which can be
obtained from ˜ x(s) by an additional transfer of 0.01 units of commodity 2
from individual (2,1) to individual (1,1).
Then, we consider the following blocking plan µ: µ(S,yS,(s,s)) = 1−ε (ε
being a very small positive number), µ(S0,yS0,(s,s)) = ε, and µ(T,yT,r)=0
for all coalitions T and states r 6=( s,s).
Then, the blocking plan µ makes all individuals involved better oﬀ. The
ex-post objection “almost works” for coalition S, except that they do not have
the information relevant to agent (2,1). This is the reason to bring agent
(1,1) into the blocking plan. Indeed, choosing ε suﬃciently small, individual
(2,1) is better oﬀ. Because agent (1,1) only participates in the blocking plan
with probability ε, in the event he receives the phone call from the blocking
mediator, he accepts the plan because he also improves. Eﬀectively, in this
event he “sells” his information to agent (2,1) for 0.01 additional units of the
numeraire. Recall that each agent believes that the status quo is still available
in the event he is not part of the blocking plan, and under these beliefs, types
are reported truthfully to the blocking plan.
Finally, it is easy to choose yS(s,s) appropriately to ensure that the block-
ing plan satisﬁes IC. Note in particular how this can be done so that the other
types of agents (1,1) and (1,2) do not have an incentive to misrepresent their
30types or accept the blocking plan. They optimally choose to truthfully stay
out of it (equations (*) and (**) applied to them).
If one drops the incentive constraints, one obtains the following parallel
result:
Proposition 6 Consider independent replicas, and suppose that incentive
constraints are dropped, and that, in every ex-post state, the core convergence
theorem holds.
• (i) The allocations in the core of unrestricted mechanisms satisfy the
equal treatment property.
• (ii) If the economy is suﬃciently replicated, x is an allocation rule in the
economy E and its replica xm is in the core of unrestricted mechanisms
in Em for every m, then x must be an ex-post Walrasian allocation rule.
Proof: The arguments in the proof of Proposition 5 do not rely on x being
IC and x0 being strictly IC. All that matters is the equal treatment property
of the ex-post core and the ex-post core convergence theorem. After one
realizes this, the proof is simpler since one does not need to check conditions
(**).
5 Ex-Post Replica Economies
Diﬀerent from the independent replica process studied so far, Serrano, Vohra
and Volij (2001) propose ex-post replicas. Ex-post replicas result in infor-
mation becoming non-exclusive already in the second replica, which in turn
makes incentive constraints redundant. This is a diﬀerent sense of deﬁning
a negligible size of agents from the informational point of view.
Formally, the only diﬀerence of this replica process with respect to the
one deﬁned in the previous section is the following. Let T =
Qn
i=1 Ti be the
set of ex-post states in the basic economy. This will remain the set of ex-post
states even after replication. For each (i,j) ∈ N × Im, t(i,j) = t(i,j0) = ti, and
qm(t−i|ti)=q(t−i|ti).
For this replica process, Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001) exhibited a ro-
bust failure of the core convergence theorem for core notions that did not
31model the information transmission by means of equilibrium blocking. How-
ever, the main result of this section is the following:
Proposition 7 Consider ex-post replicas, and suppose that incentive con-
straints are either present or dropped, and that, in every ex-post state, the
core convergence theorem holds.
• (i) The allocations in the core of single-coalition deterministic mecha-
nisms satisfy the equal treatment property.
• (ii) If the economy is suﬃciently replicated, x is an allocation rule
in the economy E and its replica xm is in the core of single-coalition
deterministic mechanisms in Em for every m, then x must be an ex-post
Walrasian allocation rule.
Proof: First, as observed above, already in the second replica, the economy is
one of non-exclusive information, and therefore, even if incentive constraints
were relevant in the basic economy, they can be dropped from the second
replica onwards.
Now consider an allocation x whose replica xm is in the core of single-
coalition deterministic mechanisms in every ex-post replicated economy. When
incentive constraints are dropped, this core is identical to the ﬁne core (Dutta
and Vohra (2005), Serrano and Vohra (2007)). Moreover, in quasilinear
economies, the ex-post core is a subset of the ﬁne core (Dutta and Vohra
(2005)), and adapting an argument for the continuum (Einy, Moreno and
Shitowitz (2000b)) to large enough replica economies , the ﬁne core is a
subset of the ex-post core. Therefore, by combining these statements, we
obtain that allocations in the core of single-coalition deterministic mecha-
nisms satisfy the equal treatment property and converge to the set of ex-post
Walrasian allocations.
Remark: Putting together Propositions 7 and 2, we ﬁnd out that, when
incentive constraints are dropped, in large enough quasilinear economies, the
core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms is a subset of the ex-post
core, itself a subset of the core of unrestricted mechanisms. Therefore, all
three converge to the same set in large economies. This is not true if incentive
constraints remain relevant.
32Remark: Making use of the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 7
and of Aumann’s (1964) core equivalence theorem for the economy with an
atomless continuum of agents, one can easily establish the same equivalence
theorem for the core of single-coalition deterministic mechanisms. Recall
that in this section it is very important that the set of states of the world is
ﬁnite.
Therefore, a convergence/equivalence theorem has been established for
this case. Interestingly, when the set of states of nature is not replicated
with the economy, there is no reason to resort to the full force of random
blocking plans to obtain it. It suﬃces to apply the equilibrium logic to
blocking plans, even for those involving only a deterministic allocation rule
coming from a single coalition.
6 Signal-Based Replica Economies
We consider now a diﬀerent replica process, which we call signal-based repli-
cas. This was ﬁrst considered in McLean and Postlewaite (2002). Agents’
utility functions will depend on an underlying but unobserved state of na-
ture θ, and each agent will receive a private signal that is correlated with
the state of nature. A replication of this initial economy consists of a set of
agents whose utility functions and endowments are the same as those in the
underlying initial economy, but whose private signals across cohorts are in-
dependent conditional on θ. As the number of replicas increases, each agent
becomes small in the economy in terms of endowment, and each agent is also
“informationally small”: the conditional distribution on the state of nature
does not vary much in that agent’s signal if other agents’ signals are known.
Note that no agent’s information is redundant in this replication process: re-
gardless of the number of replications, each agent still has information that
cannot be inferred from the aggregate information of other agents.
6.1 Notation and deﬁnitions
Since the model employed in these replicas is slightly diﬀerent from the rest
of the paper, we begin with a few preliminaries. Let Θ = {θ,...,θ m} denote
the (ﬁnite) state space and let T1,...,T n be ﬁnite sets, where Ti represents
the set of possible signals that agent i ∈ N might receive. In this model,
nature chooses an element θ ∈ Θ. The state of nature is unobservable but
33each agent i receives a “signal” that is correlated with nature’s choice of θ.
We denote the probability distribution on Θ × T as P.
The consumption set of each agent Xi is Rl−1
+ × R and for each θ ∈ Θ,
ωi ∈ Xi denotes the (state independent) initial endowment of agent i in
state θ ∈ Θ. The preferences of agent i are given by a utility function
ui : Rl−1





i is the utility
function of agent i in state θ. We note that in this model agents’ utility
functions do not depend on TN. The collection e =( {ui,X i,ω i,T i}i∈N,Θ,P)
will be called a private information economy. It will be assumed that the
data deﬁning the private information economy is common knowledge among
the agents. A private information economy allocation x =( x1,...,x n) for
the private information economy is a collection of functions xi : TN →A N.
For each state θk ∈ Θ, the collection {ui(·,θ k),ω i}i∈N deﬁnes an associ-
ated (complete information) economy. Let (z∗
i (θk))i∈N denote a Walrasian
equilibrium allocation in state θk.
Let us deﬁne a sequence of signal-based replica economies. Recall that
Im = {1,2,...,m}. Given the collection {ωi,u i}i∈N and m, let {ω(i,j),u (i,j)}(i,j)∈N×Im
denote the m replication of {ωi,u i}i∈N satisfying:
(1) ω(i,j) = ωi for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ Im,
(2) u(i,j)(x,θ)=ui(x,θ) for all x ∈ Rl−1
+ × R, i ∈ N and j ∈ Im.
For any positive integer m, let T m = T ×···×T denote the m-fold Carte-
sian product and let tm denote a generic element of T m. Let Pm be a probabil-
ity distribution on Θ×T m. Then em =( {u(i,j),X (i,j),ω (i,j),T (i,j)}(i,j)∈N×Im,Θ,P m)
is a private information economy with n × m agents.
A sequence of replica economies {({u(i,j),X (i,j),ω (i,j),T (i,j)}(i,j)∈N×Im,Θ,P m)}∞
m=
is a conditionally independent sequence if






















are independent given θ;
(c) for every θ, θ0 with θ 6= θ0, there exists a tN ∈ TN such that P(tN |
θ) 6= P(tN | θ0).
Thus a conditionally independent sequence is a sequence of private infor-
mation economies with n × m agents containing m “copies” of each agent
34i ∈ N. It follows that, for large enough m and for almost every signal pro-
ﬁle in the replica economy, one could assign a probability to a state that is
arbitrarily close to 1.
6.2 Convergence Result
In this subsection we provide a convergence result for this model. In each
state θk, we make the following (strongly) ex-post core convergence assump-
tion:14
Assumption 1: For every ε>0, there exists an integer ˆ m such that for all
m>ˆ m, if a feasible allocation in the m-fold economy, xm ∈A N×Im satisﬁes
ui(xm
i ,θ k) − ui(z∗









This assumption implies the following:
Assumption 1’: In each state θk, for all ε>0 there exists an integer ˆ m
such that for all m>ˆ m, if a feasible allocation in the m-fold economy,
xm ∈A N×Im satisﬁes
#{j ∈ Im | ui(x
m
(i,j),θ k) − ui(z
∗
i (θk),θ k) >ε } >ε m
for some i ∈ N, then there exist S ⊂ N × Im and yS ∈A S such that
P
j∈S uj(yS





We show that when m is large, and except for very unlikely signal proﬁles,
allocations in the strict IC core of unrestricted mechanisms for the m-fold
private information economy will give most agents utility that is close to that
of some Walrasian equilibrium allocation in some state θk. The following
proposition formalizes this statement. It says that for large enough replicas
the joint probability of a speciﬁc informational event is arbitrarily close to 1.
The informational event in question consists of those signal proﬁles for which
at any core allocation the ex-post utility of almost all agents is arbitrarily
close to that obtained at a strongly ex-post Walrasian allocation in some
state:
14Strongly ex-post refers to the timing after the state of the world would be observed
(something that never happens in this model), while ex-post would refer to the signal
proﬁle being commonly known by all agents, something that could happen if they chose
to pool their information.
35Proposition 8 Consider conditionally independent signal-based replicas of
a quasilinear economy in our admissible class. For every ε>0, there exists
an ˆ m>0 such that for all m>ˆ m, every strictly IC allocation in the core of





m |∃ k s.t.
#{j ∈ Im || ui(x
m
(i,j)(t
m),θ k) − ui(z
∗
i (θk),θ k)| <ε }≥(1 − ε)m
for all i ∈ N
o
≥ 1 − ε,
where (z∗
i (θk))i∈N is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation in θk.
Proof: Let m1 be the number satisfying Assumption 1’. That is, in each
state θk, for all m>m 1, if a feasible allocation in m-fold economy, xm ∈
AN×Im satisﬁes
#{j ∈ Im | ui(x
m
(i,j),θ k) − ui(z
∗
i (θk),θ k) >ε } >ε m
for some i ∈ N, then there exist S ⊂ N × Im and yS ∈A S such that
P
j∈S uj(yS





Let η := min{ε, ε2









j. We note that η satisﬁes (1 − η) · ε2
2 >η· M · n.
Applying the argument in Gul and Postlewaite (1992, p.1290), it follows




m | for some k,Pr(θ = θk | t
m) ≥ 1 − η}≥1 − η.
Let ˆ m := max{m1,m 2}.
Suppose that m>ˆ m. Let Bm
k := {tm ∈ T m | Pr(θ = θk | tm) ≥
1 − η}. We show that for every tm ∈ Bm
k , every strictly IC allocation in the
core of unrestricted mechanisms xm satisﬁes #{j ∈ Im || ui(xm
(i,j)(tm),θ k) −
ui(z∗
i (θk),θ k)| <ε }≥(1 − ε)m for all i ∈ N.
Suppose not. Then #{j ∈ Im | ui(xm
(i,j)(tm),θ k)−ui(z∗
i (θk),θ k) >ε } >ε m
for some i ∈ N. By considering a random mechanism similar to the one in
the proof of Proposition 5, it would be enough to show that there exists an
ex-post objection in tm.
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m) (because |S|≤n × m).
Since agents’ utilities are quasilinear, this inequality implies that yS is an
ex-post objection to xm in tm.
Remark: Unlike Proposition 5, this proof relies on quasilinearity.
Remark: McLean and Postlewaite (2005) establish a positive convergence
result for the ex-ante IC core under strongly conditionally independent se-
quences, which means that the distributions over each Tj are also indepen-
dent given θ in an original economy (compare with part (b) in the deﬁnition
above).
Once again, noting that the core shrinking argument in the proof of
Proposition 8 does not rely on the use of incentive constraints, one real-
izes that these can be dropped. The relevant framework now would be one
in which signals are publicly veriﬁable, but not the state of nature, which
remains unobservable. Then, one can state our ﬁnal result, whose proof can
be omitted:
Proposition 9 Consider conditionally independent signal-based replicas of
a quasilinear economy in our admissible class in which incentive constraints
are dropped. For every ε>0, there exists an ˆ m>0 such that for all m>ˆ m,
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m),θ k) − ui(z
∗
i (θk),θ k)| <ε }≥(1 − ε)m
for all i ∈ N
o
≥ 1 − ε,
37where (z∗
i (θk))i∈N is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation in θk.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies.
Results vary as a function of the class of communication mechanisms em-
ployed by coalitions and also of the replica process used. The main factor
that accounts for the diﬀerence in results is the amount of information trans-
mission that one permits each coalition to use. If random coalition formation
is possible and information can be used, within a blocking plan, from coalition
to coalition in the plan, a positive convergence result was obtained to the set
of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations, whenever this is non-
empty. But such a positive convergence result is prevented in independent
replicas if blocking communication mechanisms are restricted to being either
measurable or deterministic. On the other hand, in ex-post replicas there
is no need to go beyond deterministic mechanisms to obtain a convergence
result. In signal-based replicas, where our results are weaker, a probabilistic
convergence result was obtained for the core of unrestricted mechanisms.
We close by reiterating a very important observation. We note that, while
we have been using the incentive constraints to motivate our analysis –in part,
because the approach is rooted in mechanism design–, all our results extend
to the case in which such constraints are not imposed. It then follows that
the relevance of the results in the current paper is enhanced substantially, as
existence of ex-post Walrasian allocations is readily obtained. 15
15See also de Clippel (2007) for a diﬀerent core convergence result when incentive con-
straints are ignored.
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